The Red Team Vade Mecum
  • The Red Team Vade Mecum
  • Techniques
    • Defense Evasion
      • Binary Properties and Code Signing
      • ATA/ATP
        • Important Note
        • Intro
        • Lateral Movement
        • Domain Dominance
        • Identification
        • Recon
        • Blocking/Disabling Telemetry
          • Trusted Installer
      • Tips and Tricks
      • Basics
        • IOCs
          • High Level Overview of EDR technologies
        • Sandbox Evasion
        • Obfuscating Imports
          • Bootstrapping
        • Encrypting Strings
      • Disabling/Patching Telemetry
        • ETW Bypasses
        • AMSI Bypasses
      • Minimization
        • Commands to Avoid
        • Pivoting
        • Benefits of Using APIs
        • Thread-less Payload Execution
        • DLL Hollowing
      • Misdirection
        • Command Line Argument Spoofing
        • PPID Spoofing via CreateProcess
        • Switching Parents
          • Dechaining via WMI
      • Hiding our Payloads
        • Event Logs
        • File metadata
        • Registry Keys
        • ADS
      • IPC For Evasion and Control
    • Privilege Escalation
      • Hunting For Passwords
      • To System
        • New Service
        • Named Pipe Impersonation
        • Local Exploits
        • AlwaysInstallElevated
      • Hijacking Execution
        • Environment Variable interception
        • DLL Hijacking
      • Insecure Permissions
        • Missing Services and Tasks
        • Misconfigured Registry Hives
        • Insecure Binary Path
        • Unquoted Service Paths
    • Enumeration
      • Situational Awareness
      • Recon Commands
        • .NET AD Enum commands
        • WMIC commands
          • WMI queries from c++
    • Execution
      • Cool ways of Calling a Process
      • One Liners
    • Initial Access
      • Tips and Tricks
      • Tools
      • Staging/Stagers
      • MS Office
        • Macros
          • Evasion
            • VBA Stomping
            • Revert To Legacy Warning in Excel
            • Sandbox Evasion
          • Info Extraction
          • Inline Shapes
          • .MAM Files
          • PowerPoint
          • ACCDE
          • Shellcode Execution
          • Info Extraction
          • Dechaining Macros
        • Field Abuse
        • DDE
      • Payload Delivery
      • File Formats
        • MSG
        • RTF
        • REG
        • BAT
        • MSI Files
        • IQY
        • CHM
        • LNK
          • Using LNK to Automatically Download Payloads
        • HTA
    • Lateral Movement
      • Linux
        • SSH Hijacking
        • RDP
        • Impacket
      • No Admin?
      • Checking for access
      • Poison Handler
      • WinRM
      • AT
      • PsExec
      • WMI
      • Service Control
      • DCOM
      • RDP
      • SCShell
    • Code Injection
      • Hooking
        • Detours
      • CreateRemoteThread
      • DLL Injection
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird Injection
    • Persistence
      • Scheduled Tasks
        • AT
      • MS Office
      • SQL
      • Admin Level
        • SSP
        • Services
        • Default File Extension
        • AppCert DLLs
        • Time Provider
        • Waitfor
        • WinLogon
        • Netsh Dlls
        • RDP Backdoors
        • AppInit Dlls
        • Port Monitor
        • WMI Event Subscriptions
      • User Level
        • LNK
        • Startup Folder
        • Junction folders
        • Registry Keys
        • Logon Scripts
        • Powershell Profiles
        • Screen Savers
  • Infrastructure
    • SQL
      • MS SQL
        • Basics
        • Finding Sql Servers
        • Privilege Escalation
        • Post Exploitation
  • Other
    • Vulnerability Discovery
      • Web Vulnerabilities
        • Code Grepping
          • PHP Cheatsheet
    • Windows Internals
      • Unorganized Notes
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  • ATP
  • ATA

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  1. Techniques
  2. Defense Evasion
  3. ATA/ATP

Identification

ATP

To detect if Windows ATP is running on the machine:

Process

MsSense.exe

Service

PS C:\> Get-Service Sense
​C:\> sc query sense

Display Name: Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service

Name: Sense

Registry

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Advanced Threat Protection

File Paths

C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\

ASR Rules are stored here:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Policy Manager\

Rule name

GUID

File & folder exclusions

Minimum OS supported

BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550

Supported

D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A

Supported

3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899

Supported

75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84

Supported

D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D

Not supported

5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC

Supported

92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B

Supported

01443614-cd74-433a-b99e-2ecdc07bfc25

Supported

c1db55ab-c21a-4637-bb3f-a12568109d35

Supported

9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2

Supported

d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c

Supported

b2b3f03d-6a65-4f7b-a9c7-1c7ef74a9ba4

Supported

26190899-1602-49e8-8b27-eb1d0a1ce869

Supported

7674ba52-37eb-4a4f-a9a1-f0f9a1619a2c

Supported

e6db77e5-3df2-4cf1-b95a-636979351e5b

Not supported

To check if certain rules are enabled or not:

  • 0 = Off

  • 1 = Block

  • 2 = Audit

ATA

Check for ATA admins:

Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Group -Filter "Domain = 'dev' AND Name='Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics Administrator'" | Get-CimAssociatedInstance -Association Win32_GroupUser

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Last updated 3 years ago

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (RS3, build 16299) or greater

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​ (build 18362) or greater

Block executable content from email client and webmail
Windows 10, version 1709
Block all Office applications from creating child processes
Windows 10, version 1709
Block Office applications from creating executable content
Windows 10, version 1709
Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
Windows 10, version 1709
Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
Windows 10, version 1709
Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
Windows 10, version 1709
Block Win32 API calls from Office macros
Windows 10, version 1709
Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion
Windows 10, version 1709
Use advanced protection against ransomware
Windows 10, version 1709
Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
Windows 10, version 1709
Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
Windows 10, version 1709
Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB
Windows 10, version 1709
Block Office communication application from creating child processes
Windows 10, version 1709
Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes
Windows 10, version 1709
Block persistence through WMI event subscription
Windows 10, version 1903